Ukraine created and remotely operated a weaponized drone factory inside Russia. Ukraine also contracted honest Russian freight companies to load and move trucks and later train cars containing autonomous self-deploying fleets of drones near Russian military targets. A good analysis of the 20th century history of this type of asymmetric “behind enemy lines” tactic is here. And a great military economics and strategy analysis of the success of the operations is here.
More recently, Israel created and remotely operated a weaponized drone assembly area as well as a missile assembly area inside Iran at a much longer distance (1,500 km).
Israel also coordinated suppression of enemy aerial defense (SEAD) with these vulnerable autonomous close-range weapon operations.
I am curious about one particular aspect of these operations, namely the game theory, cognitive psychology, and longer-term strategy of the information each side in these conflicts releases as well as the timing of the information release. Israel published the fact that some information released was intended to gather targeted leaders at the same location.
“We knew this would lead them to meet, but more importantly, we knew how to keep them there.”
So my question is, why would Israel publish this deception tactic? Does Disclosing Manipulation Make Responses More Predictable or Manipulable?
Game Theory Perspective
In game theory, strategic interactions are modeled as games where players choose actions based on a payoff matrix that reflects the costs and benefits of their decisions. By publicly revealing their ability to manipulate and strike senior Iranian leaders, Israel effectively alters this matrix for Iran. The disclosure signals that Israel possesses superior intelligence and operational capacity, which Israel hopes will constrain Iran’s strategic options. For example, Iranian leaders might now prioritize protecting their remaining leadership, leading to defensive moves—such as dispersing key figures or fortifying command structures—that Israel could anticipate. If Iran perceives Israel’s capabilities as credible, their responses might become more predictable, as they react within a narrower set of choices designed to mitigate the revealed threat. However, if Iran suspects a bluff or seeks to challenge Israel’s resolve, they might opt for unpredictable counter-moves, complicating the outcome. Thus, game theory suggests predictability increases only if Iran’s leadership accepts the new strategic reality and adjusts rationally. Which AI models the psychology of the Iranian ruling counsel?
Military Strategy Perspective
Military strategy often employs deception, surprise, and psychological pressure to disrupt an adversary’s decision-making. Historically, targeting an enemy’s command structure—like Israel’s strike on senior leaders—aims to sow chaos and impair coordination. By disclosing this tactic, Israel may be engaging in psychological warfare, intending to demoralize Iran’s military and force its leaders into a reactive stance. If successful, this could lead to more cautious or standardized responses, such as adhering to established protocols, which are easier to predict. For instance, military doctrines often emphasize redundancy and pre-set contingency plans when leadership is threatened, potentially making Iran’s next steps more formulaic. However, this strategy risks backfiring if Iran interprets the disclosure as provocation and responds with unconventional or tactics intended to reduce predictability.
Psychological Perspective
My intuition—that paranoid, angry individuals are less predictable than calm, rational ones—is supported by some psychological research, that links heightened emotional states to impulsive or erratic behavior. However, the Israeli military’s disclosure might rest on a newer psychological hypothesis: under extreme stress or fear, people can revert to instinctual, habitual, or risk-averse patterns, making their actions more foreseeable. For example, surviving Iranian leaders, now aware of Israel’s lethal manipulation, might experience heightened paranoia or a sense of vulnerability. Their reactions would lead them to centralize decision-making, executing predictable operations, or over-rely on familiar, existing strategies—all of which could simplify Israel’s ability to anticipate their moves. Additionally, the stress of knowing they were outmaneuvered might induce “analysis paralysis,” where overthinking limits Iran’s flexibility, inadvertently making their responses even more manipulable. While evidence isn’t definitive, studies on stress responses (e.g., in crisis decision-making) suggest that extreme pressure can sometimes narrow behavioral options, supporting the idea that disclosure could enhance predictability under specific conditions.
Other Advantages of Disclosing This Information
Beyond influencing predictability, Israel’s public statement offers a few strategic benefits:
Deterrence: By showcasing their ability to orchestrate events and eliminate key figures, Israel signals to Iran that further aggression could invite similarly devastating strikes. This raises the perceived cost of escalation, potentially deterring offensive actions.
Psychological Warfare: The disclosure could erode morale among Iran’s military leadership, fostering distrust or fear of internal leaks (e.g., how Israel knew where and when to strike). This psychological pressure might weaken Iran’s cohesion, giving Israel an edge.
Signaling Resolve: The statement demonstrates Israel’s willingness and capability to act decisively, which could bolster domestic support, reassure allies, or justify their operations to the international community.
Risks and Caveats
While these advantages are compelling, the disclosure carries risks. It might provoke Iran into retaliating aggressively, especially if leaders view their setback as a public humiliation. Alternatively, Iran could adapt by enhancing security measures for their leaders—such as avoiding predictable gatherings—making future strikes harder. The effectiveness of this strategy hinges on how Iran’s leadership interprets and reacts to the revelation.
Conclusion
There is no conclusive proof that disclosing intentional manipulation makes an enemy’s responses more predictable or manipulable, but principles from game theory, military strategy, and psychology suggest it’s plausible under certain conditions. Game theory indicates that revealing capabilities could limit Iran’s strategic options, military strategy highlights the potential for disruption and reactive behavior, and psychology posits that stress might constrain decision-making patterns. Alongside these effects, the disclosure serves broader goals like deterrence and psychological warfare, though it risks escalation or adaptation by Iran. Ultimately, the success of this approach depends on how Iran’s leaders process the new reality Israel has imposed.
